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Abstract 
It is a strong trend in road traffic to implement pricing methods because of heavy congestions. In the 
same way as in an other transport sector, airport capacity needs to be priced in the congested areas 
in order to ascertain its efficient use. The aim of this paper is to analyse the possibilities of applying 
marginal cost pricing models by evaluating the airport charges. I also focus on the possibilities to 
increase the efficiency of capacity allocation, but it also must be seen in a wider perspective, how to 
ensure that airport infrastructure capacity is efficiently provided and used. 
In the first part I analyse the specific situation of airports, identify the factors, which determine 
the capacity of an airport. Then the currently used charging system will be presented and analysed. 
After this a theoretical approach will be presented; how to apply a new charging system based on 
marginal cost pricing. In the next chapter the purpose is to identify and assess the main barriers lo the 
implementation of the new pricing principles and to recommend strategies to overcome these barriers. 
The paper focuses one specific cost aspect, the marginal capacity cost for using existing 
capacity at major airports. I therefore disregard possible problems with respect to cost recovery of 
airports that have sufficient capacity during most of the day. 
Keywords: airtransport, airport, charging, externalities, pricing acceptability. 
1. The Situation of Airport Infrastructure 
/. /. Specialities of Airport Infrastructure and Costs 
Airlines have developed hub-and-spoke networks, up until 1997, based on bilat-
eral agreements between the countries. The European airlines can free develop 
their most favourable networks since liberalization and the introduction of cabo-
tage rights. Major congestion is generated at hub airports and it is a direct result of 
demands. Travellers flying through a hub want to minimise layover time. Airlines 
therefore fly in within an hour or two and then fly out within an hour or two in 
two or three waves over a 24 hour period. Airport capacity must satisfy this peak 
demand and slot must be allocated to enable such network patterns. Without the 
ability to fly in waves, a more fully connected network will grow with inefficiencies 
and higher prices for passengers. A balance needs to be found, where sufficient 
infrastructure is available to minimise congestion and delays. 
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There arc several types of difficulties on airports, which can give rise to 
economic inefficiency. The reasons arc the following: 
• Because the demand for airport services is in many cases lower than capacity, 
the airport is a natural monopoly for which the standard efficiency questions 
arise. 
• The demand for airport services is not equal to the demand for transport 
between only two airports, but among different airports. That is because 
the size of some markets between airports is so small that the continuity 
assumption, which is typically employed in economic analysis is not relevant. 
• The efficiency problems are increasing, because larger airports are often dom-
inated by one airline. 
• Larger airports are often congested, and the natural monopoly problem is 
also increasing, that makes the appropriate use of existing, and construction 
of new capacity more and more difficult. The services provided by an airport 
include four components: the passenger and the freight terminals - often 
separate buildings - the air traffic control system and the runways. 
The infrastructure cost comprises two components, in order to satisfy the 
users' demand: to construct the necessary facilities and the cost for maintaining 
them and keeping them available for use by airlines. The average cost is the sum 
of these (appropriately discounted) components over the lifetime of the facility, 
which is divided by the total number of users over this period. Opposed to this, 
the marginal cost takes into account the cost generated by additional take-offs or 
landings. 
Airports in many countries are operated by national or regional agencies or 
by airlines and prices are designed in order to maximise profits. Airport agencies 
are not responsible for the allocation of access to runways; this is in many cases the 
responsibility of the users. Airport congestion is relevant not only for the airport 
itself and for the efficiency in using its facilities; it is of equal importance for the 
functioning of the air transport industry at large. A proper way to deal with airport 
capacity is to improve the functioning of the entire air transport sector. 
1.2. Determining Factors of Airport Capacity 
The capacity of an airport is defined as the volume of passengers and cargo that 
can be accommodated within a given time period (e.g. an hour). This capacity is 
determined by the following components: 
• runway capacity: the maximum number of take offs and landings that can be 
performed, 
• terminal capacity: the number of passengers that can move about the terminal 
at an acceptable pace, 
• apron capacity: the maximum number of aircraft per area that can be served. 
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• air traffic control capacity: the maximum number of aircraft approaching or 
departing the airport, 
• gates: number of gates available. 
All components are meant in a time period (hour) and in safe conditions. Increasing 
capacity mustn't influence safety in a negative way. 
If capacity is insufficient to satisfy demand, or there is more demand per time 
unit than available capacity, then delays will be generated. 
To describe the demand for airport capacity, two main types of classifications 
are needed: 
• The traffic pattern at large (the origin-destination demand matrix of passen-
gers), which also reflects the configuration of airline networks (e.g. hub-and-
spoke, multi hub, alliances linked networks, linear networks). 
• Daily and seasonal, peak and off-peak demand patterns. 
2. The Aim and Measurement of Pricing 
One of the most important issues regarding airport charges is: spending the revenues 
collected. Charging will be used to cover total cost, including long-run capital 
costs. The main question is how to set the charges so as to maximize the social 
welfare function of all users, including passengers, airlines transporting freight and 
passengers, airports, their owners and the general public, which means people living 
in the immediate vicinity of the airports. The objective is constrained by an airport 
break-even constraint, in which the airport is required to raise sufficient airside 
funds to cover its variable, fixed and infrastructure costs. 
The evaluation of various resources to organise and handle airport activities 
is the same as the process for the allocation of scarce economic goods. The criteria 
are that airport capacity is a critical resource in the operation of an airline. The 
following standards can be used to evaluate the performance of alternative processes 
for capacity allocation: 
• Equity: flight services to small companies are given due consideration by the 
allocation method. 
• (Static) efficiency: the value delivered to the consumers from a resource base. 
Because the airport slot is a critical point in air service operations, the whole 
efficiency of the air transportation system depends almost directly on the 
efficiency of slot allocation. 
• Carrier expansion and contraction: carriers with efficient marginal operations 
(relative to the marginal operations of other carriers) should expand within a 
given market. Because of critical slots, additional slots can be allocated to 
those carriers that have relatively high profit opportunities for additional slots. 
It makes the potential entrant possible since it is similar to an expanding firm. 
Because of this, the slots for expanding carriers should come from carriers 
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whose marginal operations are the least efficient, and therefore marginally 
unprofitable services, and less successful operators should be induced to exit 
from the business by the selected mechanism. 
• Coordination: carriers have time limitations to make their operations. This 
means that benefits can be achieved by better coordination of carrier services. 
Any system in slot allocation process should promote such coordination of 
service and capacity use patterns. 
• System-level efficiency: carrier operations at different airports depend on 
each other, because any flight must involve (at least) two airports. Systems of 
slot allocations operating at many different airports must identify themselves 
with the efficiency gains and reductions in the overall cost. This can result 
proper coordination among airports. 
• Monopoly and collusion: slot allocation is one of the main factors in the 
competition. That is one reason why airlines tend to operate in collusion. In 
any market, controlling the slots can develop and enforce the non-competitive 
practices. Therefore, it must be dealt with the slot allocating processes very 
carefully in order to prevent these possibilities. 
• Long-run industry growth (dynamic efficiency): the industry is not able to 
expand without additional capacity. In present, capacity expansion neces-
sarily absorbs important resources. One measure of the need for capacity 
expansion is the value, which is created by additional slots. If these values, 
integrated over time, arc greater than the cost of expansion, then capacity 
expansions are in order. The allocation procedure should be supportive to 
this end. If there are absolute barriers to capacity expansion, it is important 
to ascertain efficiency in the allocation of the slots. 
• Transaction costs: the allocation procedure should be cheap to administer, 
including, that it is necessary to maximise the safety, etc. 
3. The Currently Used Pricing System 
3.1. Elements and Aim of Current Pricing 
Direct airport users include airlines, passengers and cargo. The airlines are charged 
by the airports per landing (according to the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft) 
and per departing passengers, with a standard two-tariff: transfer and non-transfer 
charge. 
The structure of the tariffs is mainly linked to the technical features of the 
aircraft such as weight, and the duration of infrastructure use. Landing and take-off 
charges arc determined as follows: 
• Landing charges. The charge applied to the aircraft is depending on the 
maximum take-off weight (a price per ton is fixed for the first 25 tons and a 
higher price for the following tons). 
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• Parking fees for aircraft on the apron. The charge is depending on the air-
crafts' maximum take-off weight and is equal for internal and international 
flights. 
The result is a price structure that does not reflect management and operating costs, 
and does not differentiate between peak and off peak times. The level of landing 
charges and parking charges increases for night flights in many cases. This results 
a further reduction in flying during less congested periods such as night (at those 
airports where night flying is permitted). 
Airport activity related charges nowadays consist mainly of the following two 
services: 
• Airport tariffs. These charges are in accordance with landing and take-off, 
aircraft parking, passenger boarding, freight loading and unloading, security 
and control for passengers and freight. 
• Handling, which means administrative assistance and supervision, baggage 
assistance, freight and mail, runway operations assistance, cleaning and ramp 
services, fuel assistance, aircraft maintenance assistance, air operations and 
crew assistance, ground transport and catering. 
Taking into account the social welfare, this pricing system is inefficient, because 
it ignores the most important externalities associated with airport use: congestion, 
environmental pollution and capacity usage. In most countries, airport charges are 
set by local or national government in order to guarantee sufficient income, which 
can cover operational and capital costs, without taking into account the welfare of 
airlines, passengers or the public at large. 
The landing charges can also include other elements such as a noise and envi-
ronmental charge (depending on the type of aircraft), a peak time slot (according to 
the flight take-off time) and apron facility charges. Additional charges per passenger 
include ground handling facilities and gates. 
The airport handling services market is in most cases privatised, and special-
ized companies handle the baggage and cargo. The tariffs within this market are 
generally determined through contracts between the handling services operator and 
the customer, based on a multiplicity of factors: cost, market power and medium 
and long-term objectives of the operators. The tariffs are therefore unequal, and 
generally made for the specific customer. 
If there exists a tax on aircraft noise emissions, it is normally added on top of 
the airlines' landing charges, and depends on noise emissions. So the airlines pay, 
and the airport operators collect these tax, and the latter ones transfer it directly 
to city, county or federal governments. The revenues have the following objects: 
to finance the reduction of noise emission from aircrafts, to complete and improve 
acoustic pollution monitoring systems, to reduce noise pollution and to pay com-
pensation to residents living near the airport area. This charge already exists at 
many airports. Fees according to NO ( and CO2 emissions are not yet included in 
any charges. 
4 * B KOVXKJ 
Non-aeronautical fees collected from concessions are about 40 and 60% of 
all airport revenues. The question is where to allocate this additional revenue? 
Should it be used to expand existing infrastructure or should airside operations 
alone be covered by it? If the government owns the airport, it is also a question 
what yield level could be acceptable with respect to airside operations and if airport 
profitability should include non-aeronautical income. If airport managers received 
bonuses based on revenue achieved, all aspects of airport revenue would be pro-
moted. However, landside parties depend entirely on derived airside demand in 
general. 
3.2. Impacts of Currently Used Pricing 
Any charge for infrastructure use will have influences on total demand for capacity. 
Although they are only a part of the airlines' total cost, charges for using airport 
facilities have an impact on ticket prices for travellers and freight senders. 
Airport pricing affects following main areas: 
• passenger utility, 
• airline profitability, 
• mode of operation. 
3.2.1. Passenger 
The passenger pays the price of the ticket and pays directly or indirectly airport 
tax. Passengers are also influenced by the length of the travel time, which is a 
function of various airport processing times including air traffic control, runway, 
apron, security and terminal delays. Passengers cannot be seen as a homogeneous 
multitude (different income and value of time), that is because these effects may 
be non-uniform and can result inequalities (from potential, additional welfare and 
equity point of view). 
3.2.2. Airlines 
The airport pricing affects airlines' behaviour in many ways. Because of air traffic 
control and runway congestion, airlines may re-schedule their flights to less con-
gested periods. This can affect the airline competitivness, because some passengers 
may travel with other airlines or modes of transport. It also influences revenues due 
longer layovers and lower productivity. In long-term airlines they may change their 
networks, which results a different network pattern, and they cannot use various 
network economies directly resulting from the hub and spoke system. 
Prices also have impact on the number of take-offs and landings at each airport, 
although price elasticity may be low, the higher the charge the lower the demand 
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is. Standard charges are not at a level that automatically clears the market on the 
major airports. These typically make clear, which periods of the day have more 
demand than available capacity. Airlines cannot get as many rights for take off or 
land - the number of slots - as they demand at existing price levels. The degree 
of this problem is different in every airport, but some big airports in Europe have 
more demand during the biggest part of the day than available. 
4. Using New Methods for Pricing 
4.1. Airport Costs 
The airport must decide on the following key issues, according to the nature of the 
airport authority (privately vs. publicly owned) and to the factors mentioned above: 
• the overall objective function, 
• charging scheme, 
• slot allocation scheme, 
• capacity investment decisions. 
From a social welfare viewpoint an airport should consider all factors when 
setting charges on the incoming and outgoing traffic. So the charge scheme should 
aim at maximizing social welfare, such that costs are covered and externalities 
internalized. Nowadays, as mentioned above, the charges cover only operational 
and capital costs, without taking into consideration the social welfare at large. 
4.2. New Elements need to be Considered 
The price determination mechanism is fundamentally different among the services. 
It is important to have uniform charging principles on Europe level in the long run, 
based on the following criteria: 
• airport differentiation according to traffic dimension (size of market), 
• correlation with the quality and quantity of the supplied services, 
• differentiation within airports according to traffic intensity during a day, 
• cost recovery considerations, including development and improvement, 
• environmental protection goals. 
In Table 1 the main externalities are summarised which are caused by air 
transport and must be included in pricing. 
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Table I. Externalities at airports 
Externality Driver 
Demand profile and volume 
Airport capacity 
Technological infrastructure 
Operational: congestion and delays Airport operational characteristics 
Airframe characteristics and 
operating conditions (e.g. head up 
display) 
Demand profile and volume 
Air traffic control behaviour 
Safety: accidents, congestion, delays Airport capacity 
Technological infrastructure 
Airframe operating conditions 
Demand profile and volume 
Population area and density 
Environmental: noise, air and water Aircraft characteristics (e.g. noise) 
pollution Traffic patterns 
Airport operational characteristics 
Technological infrastructure 
4.3. Theoretical Background for New Methods 
In this part an overview will be given about the economic solutions, which can 
be used for the new charging scheme. These models include the most important 
factors mentioned above (peak and off-peak, congestion, externalities and airport 
economics). 
4.3.1. Peak and Off-Peak Time Pricing 
First I assume a daily periodicity in demand with peak and off-peak intervals. The 
question is how should peak and off-peak demand be priced in order to cover the 
capital costs of an airport. The biggest part of these costs is the investment in 
capacity, which is primarily depending on peak demand. The solution can be the 
creation of a social welfare function, which includes five main elements: demand 
and operating costs in peak and off-peak periods and the cost of capital. Following 
assumptions are made in solving the problem: 
• the objective is to maximize the social welfare function. 
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• operating costs at each period are equal (we do not have to pay special atten-
tion to this), 
• the airport has two demand periods: peak and off-peak, 
• airport capacity (which has the following important determining factors: run-
way, terminal, apron and parking) is in this model handled as a single re-
striction. Usually, the runway capacity is enough limitation and all other 
constraints are redundant, 
• the demand and cost functions are shown in Fig. I. 
Fig. I. The demand and the cost functions 
The social welfare function, which has to be maximised, includes customer 
surplus in peak and off-peak time periods and the cost of capital (not so significant), 
which affects the capacity of the airport. Flights are limited by the capacity of the 
airport and the total costs must be less than or equal to total revenue. The results of 
this model suggest that, based on the peak and off-peak demand, it is possible for 
both periods to share the cost of capital. 
4.3.2. Delay (Congestion) Pricing 
A critical assumption in the previous model was, that the capacity at an airport is 
sufficient to satisfy peak period demand. In reality, this is rarely the case, mostly 
on hub airports, because of the following reasons: 
• As many slots are allocated as are equal to capacity. Random disturbances 
can result delays (or early arrive) of aircrafts; that can also be because of 
overestimating the capacity. Of course, this can be expressed in delay or 
disturbance cost. 
• The total number of slots is insufficient to satisfy all demand. 
The result is traffic delays, which will generate congestion externalities if unpriced. 
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4.3.3. Externalities 
There is a gap between the cost to users (airlines) of utilizing the airport and marginal 
social costs because of externalities (congestion, environmental), which are a part 
of the costs imposed on others, e.g. residents near to the airport. Airport charges 
should also regard these kinds of market failure effects, in a way similar to that of 
congestion. 
4.4. Aitn of the New Mechanism 
The proposed pricing measures aim to correct inefficiencies including: 
• Peak and off-peak charges, needed because of airline network choice. The 
objective is to ensure efficient use of current capacity. 
• Congestion charges, needed because of limited runway capacity: Demand 
can exceed available capacity, which generates congestion and delay. This 
delay may not be internalised in its entirety by all airlines. Airlines at hub air-
ports internalise their own congestion costs, which suggests that such charges 
would be relatively low. However, congestion can be very high at hub air-
ports. 
• Noise charges, part of the environmental externalities. If it is not covered, a 
social cost will result, which exceeds users' cost. 
Other externalities (air pollution, accidents, ground traffic congestion) are not con-
sidered within this short-term pricing mechanism. 
5. Steps of Implementation 
One of the important elements concerning to the implementation of the new pricing 
is: ensure that the schemes arc implemented at all airports in Europe. Some air-
ports have already begun to implement peak and night charges, but these additional 
charges are very low. Meanwhile others are cheaper over night, and the third group 
is shut down entirely over night. No airport in Europe has any congestion or delay 
charges implemented yet. 
In the short-term, implementation should include peak/off-peak, congestion 
and noise charges, at all main hub airports. In the medium and long term should 
be a harmonisation amongst all airports. Small (regional, spoke) airports may not 
be priced and this could encourage traffic to use secondary airports. Open market 
mechanisms can encourage higher prices and therefore moving profits from airlines 
to airports. Meanwhile it is important to ensure for new entrants the availability 
and use of slots. 
The most serious political barriers to implementation are caused by hub based 
flag carriers and airports, which have monopoly powers. According to the EU 
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liberalization and 'open sky' policy, airlines and airports should be privatised. This 
can encourage market mechanisms to solve the pricing problem and can guarantee 
to prevent monopoly power. Some airports could remain government-owned and 
regulated, but in this case it is important to regulate airside and landside revenues 
together. A profit maximizing monopolist, when controlling airside operations and 
concessions, too, will: 
• reduce the price of operations in order to increase travel through the airport, 
• increase revenues from concession profits. 
6. Barriers of Implementation 
The most important barriers of implementation of the new pricing scheme will be 
discussed in this section. The barriers have three main categories: institutional, 
acceptability and technological. 
6.1. Institutional 
The biggest barrier today is the lack of transparency, which is because making 
suggestions for appropriate tariff setting is very difficult. It is very difficult to find 
the formula, on which setting airport charges is based. In fact it may be true that no 
formulas are used to set charges; only simple accounting rules are based on: last 
year's tariffs, the level of inflation (price increase must be at least equal to this), the 
competitors' levels (other airports around Europe). 
The first institutional and legal requirement in order to begin the policy of 
new pricing mechanism is to clearly specify the current formulas (which are often 
set by local or state government). Understanding and publishing these methods will 
help to: 
• reduce lobby power that always prefers the status quo, 
• improve acceptability of the entire scheme among politicians and the public. 
A second barrier is the lack of harmonization between the countries in the 
EU. A pricing formula must be developed at EU level, which all countries agree. 
This formula must ensure minimum differences among airports. The charge level 
can be different in the countries but the evaluating methods should be similar. It 
is important, because all externalities must be internalised and not simply passed 
from one country or region to another. This method must have an appropriate 
administrative background like EUROCONTROL. This body could ensure that if 
there is a change in tariffs because of peak demand, the airports are able to respond. 
Of course e.g. use of newer aircraft with lower noise level should be promoted 
through appropriate tariffs. 
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6.2. Acceptability 
The most airports in Europe are also not yet privatised and hub airports behave like 
monopolists. If the aim is to maximize social welfare, the results of the methods 
are different from the current situation. Another issue is the lobby power on the 
directly interested parties' and the political organizations' side, so it will not be 
simple to change the pricing mechanisms. Only the implementation in stages can 
be manageable and several paths are available, as discussed above. 
6.2.1. Airlines 
An important factor is, that airlines push towards monopoly using hub airport market 
power. The aim of the airline is profitability through aggregation of demand, which 
causes lower costs. This ensures lower airfares in the long run. Airlines must be 
allowed to develop hub-spoke networks, therefore it is difficult to achieve a balance 
through regulations but it must be done. One solution can be to allow lower airport 
charges for new entrants and limit the maximum airline profits. It must be decided, 
if international carriers should pay the same price as smaller (regional) airlines. It 
is not clear, if such different charges break EU and state law. 
6.2.2. Airports 
Another important barrier of introduction marginal cost pricing is generated by the 
airports. The two main reasons are the following: 
• they do not want to annoy and risk of loosing their customers (airlines), 
• it is difficult to collect the needed additional data for evaluating tariffs. 
Because of this, there is a need to make new local and state governmental 
legislation in order to implement the new pricing method. Some legislation has 
already been made, but not in all countries and it does not give an overall solution. 
6.2.3. Passengers 
The last question according to acceptability is: should passengers be charged di-
rectly for supplied services? This is already the case in some airports and in some 
countries taxes are set in addition to the airfare paid. Airlines can also be charged 
for all relevant costs. Some of these costs will be rolled over to the travelling public, 
but presumably not the entire sum, because this would be dependent on demand 
functions. 
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6.3. Technological 
There are already some charges in the air transport industry today; important data 
are also collected. The delay data is very difficult to analyse and scarcity is not 
considered at all. Of course research-based improvements in technology can im-
prove the computation of scarcity and delay on an on-line basis. That is because 
technology cannot be a significant barrier to implementation. 
6.4. Summary of Barriers 
Expansion of airport infrastructure (e.g. building of additional runways and ter-
minals) generates political, acceptability and legal problems, which need to be 
overcome. The political problems lie in land use and environmental issues. 
The constraints according to the barriers are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. The constraints and needed measure according to the barriers of implementation 
Measure Short term Medium term Long term 
Traffic level (below marginal cost 
at small airports Limited Smooth limits No restriction 
Change current tariff Limited Smooth limits No restriction 
Price discrimination Allow price discrimination (different tariffs) between interna-tional and smaller, regional airlines, if not illegal 
Tariff level Tariffs equal to or less than marginal cost at large hub airports 
Offer tariff reduction To airlines, which invest in technology to improve capacity usage 
Tariff structure 
Allow two tariffs (peak and off-peak), 
introduce continually 
changing charges 
(based on delay data) 
Slot charges 
Research to 
analyse the 
market 
mechanism 
Apply to large, ivJ - Apply slot hub airports _ . charges to to reflect „ . ,, . . all airports allocation scarcity r 
Charge to cover research and IT 
costs for data collection issues Add additional charge Add additional charge 
Limit size of changes Limitation, until all airports in Europe are using the new pricing principles 
Budget constraint Airports mustn't be subsidized over a prc-specified level 
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